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resumo
Cientistas sociais e planejadores de políticas públicas documentaram mudanças bastante significativas na 
estrutura familiar nos Estados Unidos nas últimas três décadas. Neste artigo, analisamos o grau de cumpri-
mento de ordens de pensão alimentícia para crianças – significando a diferença entre o valor estipulado e o 
valor efetivamente pago – usando a base de dados da SIPP de 1990-1993. Exploramos os fatores que deter-
minam a existência do gap, bem como sua dimensão, usando um modelo probit. Os resultados sugerem que 
tanto a existência quanto a magnitude, o gap, são positivamente influenciadas pelo tipo de acordo firmado 
entre os pais da criança.
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abstract
Social scientists and policymakers have documented dramatic changes in the structure of US families over 
the past decades. In this paper, I analyze the child support compliance gap- the difference between expected 
payments and received child support payments- using a unique data set from the 1990-1993 SIPP on child 
support agreements. I explore the factors that determine the existence and the magnitude of a gap in payments 
using a probit model and regression analysis.  Results suggest that both the existence of and magnitude of the 
child support gap are positively influenced by non-voluntary agreements received by the custodial parent.
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1 iNtroductioN
Social scientists and policymakers have documented dramatic changes in the structure of US 
families over the past three decades. Divorce rates rose dramatically between 1970 and 1980, but 
stabilized more recently, dropping to 4.3 percent by 1996. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Over the 
same period, there was an increase in the number of single parent headed households.  In 1970, 
only 12% of the children under 18 years old lived with one parent; by 1990, 25% of children lived in 
a single parent headed household. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1999).   It is interesting to note that 
more than 57% of the black children under 18 years old live with only one parent (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1998).  Policymakers have been concerned with these trends because living in a sin-
gle parent household has been shown to have negative consequences for children, increasing the 
probability of teen pregnancy and of becoming a high school dropout (McLanahan and Sandefur, 
1992).  Single parent families are also linked to poverty.  In 1996, 44.3% of the persons living in 
families with a female householder with no spouse present, and residing with related children were 
below the poverty level.  (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997).
By late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the U.S. Government focused attention on the issues involving 
children in single-parent homes, including their well being and ways to move these groups above 
the poverty level. The passage of the Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 1975 was designed to 
decrease dependence on welfare programs, particularly AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children). At the same time, the federal government shifted responsibility for the collection of child 
support to the states. (Beller and Graham, 1993).  The result of this shift was the establishment of 
new child support guidelines by more than half of the states by 1989.  By the late 1980s, legislation 
concerning paternity establishment, income withholding and medical support orders were in effect 
in almost every state.  (Garfinkel, McLanahan and Robins, 1994). 
The impact of these various state level legislative programs has been the focus of research 
by several authors. Sorensen and Halpern (1999) use Current Population Survey (CPS) data and 
detailed information at the state-level to conclude that stronger child support enforcement has sig-
nificant effect on child support receipts. Nixon (1997) also uses CPS data, but her focus is on the 
effects of child support enforcement on marital breakup. She found out that tougher child support 
enforcement reduces marital disruption. 
Prior research on child support enforcement has concentrated on the levels of government ex-
penditure on and efficiency of new programs, the impact of increased child support on labor force 
participation rates of men and women, and measurement of   compliance rates.  Another question 
frequently asked is why non-resident parents do not pay previously agreed to child support awards 
(Beller and Graham, 1993), and how some behaviors, as visitation frequency and both parents labor 
force participation, positive or negatively influences the non-custodial parents propensity to pay the 
child support order. (Veum, 1992). Researchers have found that the determinants of child support 
agreements include the financial situation of both parents and the difference among resident pa-
rents in requesting child support. (Beller and Graham, 1993). Differences in the enforcement regi-
mes of child support laws among states make it more likely that some children receive higher help 
of the non-resident parent than others or that some persons are more inclined to set a voluntary 
agreement than going to a court. (Johnson, 2001). 
In this paper, I analyze the child support compliance gap – the difference between expected 
child support payments and received child support payments. I use a unique data set from the 
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1990-1993 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) on child support agreements, 
which includes information about custodial parents and more detailed information about the 
agreements, visitation patterns and labor force participation of resident and non-resident parents.1 
These unique data allow me to provide previously unavailable descriptive statistics on the nature 
of child support agreements.  I explore the factors that determine the existence and the magnitude 
of a gap in payments using a probit model and regression analysis. To control for the endogeneity 
between female labor supply and the magnitude of the child support gap, I also present estimates 
from an instrumental variables strategy. Finally, I use multinomial logit analysis to determine the 
factors that induce three distinct types of agreements- court ordered, voluntary, or by alternative 
arrangement. My results suggest that both the existence of and magnitude of the child support gap 
are positively influenced by non-voluntary agreements received indirectly by the custodial parent. 
Family income also has the influence of increasing the odds of a gap as well its size.2 
In the next section, I describe the data set to be used and present demographics for the sample 
selected for use in this study. Section 3 describes the two models that are used to study the existen-
ce and the magnitude of the gap, besides the analysis of the consequences of the type of agreement 
on the dependent variable. Finally, in the last section, I summarize the results and note several 
conclusions that may imply on political changes referring child support awards.
2 data aNd descriptive statistics 
The SIPP is a nationally representative survey of the civilian U.S. population conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau. The purpose of the core data collection is to gather income and labor for-
ce information, program participation and eligibility, and demographic characteristics to measure 
the achievement of federal, state, and local programs. Estimation of future costs for the government 
programs is also an aim of the SIPP. 
All persons aged 15 years and older in each of the 14,000 to 36,700 sample households are 
interviewed.3 In order to facilitate the interview process, each household belongs to the sample for 
2.5 to 4 years,4 and is interviewed repeatedly at four-month intervals.5 Interviews are mainly made 
personally, with some telephone contacts to obtain missing information or as a form of contact with 
persons that moved and could not be reached personally.6 For this present study, the 1991 to 1993 
surveys are used. This period of analysis is adequate since the beginning of the efforts with respect 
to child support enforcement were made 15 years before, with the Title IV-D, in 1975. During the 
1990’s, the states implemented laws concerning child support enforcement.7 
In addition to the core data collected each quarter, extra questions are included on “topical” 
modules. Topical module questions address major subjects that do not require quarterly updates, 
1 The lack of information concerning non-custodial parent is one of the common critiques of studies on child support compli-
ance, as can be seen in Sonestein and Calhoun (1990). The comparison between non-custodial and custodial parent responses 
is beyond the scope of this study.
2 A labor force participation indicator for custodial parent has a negative effect only on the size of the gap, and this effect is robust 
across OLS and IV specifications.
3 The number of respondents varies depending on the year and wave.
4 In 1996 was introduced a new panel with four years of duration.
5 The active sample is divided into 4 groups of approximately the same size and these are called rotation groups.  During four 
consecutive months, each rotation group is interviewed; one per month.
6 Telephone interviews occur in about 5% of the cases. (Peterson and Nord, 1989).
7 To deal with these transformations, indicator variables for laws’ changes were included in the regressions.
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and these questions change from wave to wave. The topical module files address significant pro-
grams and policy questions and do not need to be updated each wave. 
A unique feature of the SIPP data used in this study is the ability to link the panel responses 
to the child support topical module file. The child support topical module file8 contains data about 
child support orders, receipts, type of agreement and custodial arrangement, how the payments are 
made, and resident parent characteristics.9 In addition to these questions, it also has information 
with respect to the non-resident parent, including number of days he/she usually spends with his/
her children or where does he/she lives.10 
Table 1 presents demographics characteristics for three different sub-samples: All Parents, 
Custodial Parents Only and Custodial Parents With Agreement. The All Parents Sample includes 
families with both parents as well single headed households; Custodial Parents Only is a sub-sam-
ple that includes only households characterized by the presence of a children with an absent parent, 
not mattering if a child support agreement is settled. The final sub-sample is Custodial Parents 
With Agreement that includes, from the sub-sample Custodial Parents Only, those households 
where there is some kind of child support agreement.11 This last sub-sample is the main sample for 
the present analysis.
For all years, the sample that includes all parents has a higher mean age than the sub-sam-
ples of single-headed households. The average number of children in families with a child support 
agreement varies between 1.48 in 1992 and 1.58 in 1993.12 The data also show a small increase in 
the percentage of families receiving child support (44.1% in 1991 to 46.8% in 1993).
The ethnic profile of child support agreement holders remains fairly constant across sample 
years. It is interesting to look at the results for minorities, particularly blacks, given their relatively 
higher incidence of being in single-parent households. (see U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998). 
For all years, the sample of custodial parents with or without agreement has higher incidence of 
blacks, compared to the fraction of this ethnicity on the other sub-samples. On average, they repre-
sent 11.5% of all parents and 21.5% of all single parents. 
More than 70% of individuals with children in the sample are currently married.  Among 
parents with a child support agreement, roughly 45% are currently divorced.  When we look at 
families with child support agreements, we see that never married parents are far more likely to 
have an agreement than those that are “separated” from their spouse. This fact may indicate that 
it is easier for a never married person to achieve some kind of child support agreement than for a 
separated parent. Since the marital status “separated” is usually temporary, this is not a surprising 
result. Also, separation often is a pre-cursor to divorce, meaning that the relationship between 
the parents that ended the marriage may make it more difficult to come to a consensus on a child 
support agreement. The way parents maintain their relationship after the disruption has a funda-
mental role in the child support gaps.
8 Conducted in waves 3, 6 or 9, depending on the year.
9 For instance: education, race, marital status, etc.
10 Although linking is one of the best features of the SIPP, it is not possible to link couples after the divorce. The custodial parent 
provides answers concerning the absent parent. If the couple divorces during the period its household belongs to the SIPP’s 
sample, both parents will provide answers about their lives, however, the child support questions will be provided only by the 
custodial one.
11 Notice that neither one of these sub-samples imply a single-headed household. It may be possible that the custodial parent 
remarried; therefore, he/she is not the only adult on the household.
12 The total number of children is not available from the SIPP data. However, it contains the total number of children receiving 
child support, which is more relevant for the present study.
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The sample with all parents has a slightly larger number of college graduates than the sub-sam-
ples for all years. Single parent households are more likely to be headed by individuals with lower 
levels of formal education.  Family income is on average higher for the all parents sample (more than 
$3,000) than for the single headed households. It is interesting to notice that families with an agree-
ment have higher income than the sample that includes all families with a single head and children 
(roughly $200 more). Child support agreement compliance may represent an increase in the family 
income and, in this way, help families to avoid the poverty level.  Another possibility is that families 
with higher income have more resources to fight for a child support agreement or order.13 
The descriptive statistics also provide some very interesting, and previously unavailable statis-
tics regarding the nature of the child support arrangements. In most agreements, the mother is de-
signated as custodial parent;14 very few men are the head of a household with a child and an absent 
parent.  The percentage of men that have custody of a child and have some type of child support 
agreement is also quite low ranging between 5.8% in 1991 and 3.8% in 1993. However, parents who 
reach an agreement visit their children more frequently than parents without agreements (approxi-
mately 30 days per year against only 13 for parents without an agreement). Previous studies suggest 
that the more involved a parent is with his/her child’s lives, the more likely the absent parent is to 
support them financially. (see Robins and Dickinson, 1985).
Finally, the place of non-custodial parent residence appears to be correlated with reaching a 
child support agreement. More than 70% of the families that achieve an agreement have a non-
custodial parent who lives in the same city, county or state. There were incentives to the States to 
create laws to improve the settlement of agreements, and collection of the amount ordered, between 
parents living in different States (see Garfinkel, McLanahan and Robins, 1994).15 For the most 
part, these laws were implemented during the 1990’s, therefore the effects of this new legislation 
may not be captured by this sample. 
3 existeNce aNd magNitude of the gap: aN empirical iNvestigatioN
Distinct factors influence child support awards and receipts. As extensively described in Bel-
ler and Graham (1993), while some emotional factors16 before and after the separation or divorce 
influence the willingness to settle a child support agreement, financial conditions of both parents 
also have some bearing on this decision. Child support receipt is expected to exert great influence 
over the employment situation of both parent, their income, existence of a new family, State law en-
forcement, time spend with children after divorce and custodial parent conditions to look for help 
on requesting the compliance with the award. My main goal with this investigation is to unders-
tand both the custodial parent own characteristics that influence the observance of the agreement, 
but also the settlement features that may point out the odds of increasing or decreasing the gap 
between child support orders and receipts.
13 Endogeneity may be playing some rule on these results. The section about multinomial logit model will explore this issue.
14 Over this study, the use of the words “non-resident” and “non-custodial” are interchangeable, since the custody that it is referred 
to is the “physical custody”.
15 American society is notoriously recognized by its mobility. The compliance with child support orders decreases when the non-
custodial parent moves away from his children. Federal and state laws were created to deal with this problem: the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act was approved by the American Bar Association in 1993 and it is now enacted in all jurisdictions; 
the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act was enacted in 1994; and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments Act, revised in 1964 and it is enacted in 44 states and DC. See Morgan (1999).
16 Here we are referring to the effects of couple relationship and parent-child bond.
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The following analysis is based on the gap between child support orders or agreements, and 
the self-reported amount received by the custodial parent. The gap variable is defined by:
	 Gap	=	Child	Support	Ordered	–	Child	Support	Actually	Received												 (1)
In Table 2, I present descriptive statistics on the gap in child support receipts, as well as the 
average dollar amount anticipated and the average dollar amount actually received by the custodial 
parent.  For all child support agreements in the sample, the average anticipated amount per year is 
$3,596 and the average amount actually received is $3,047. Therefore, the average gap for the entire 
sample of families with a child support award in place is $549.  Families holding agreements where 
the parent’s have joint custody generally have higher anticipated average amounts and lower gaps 
between expected and actual payments.  Anticipated child support awards are also higher for those fa-
milies with voluntary agreements and for those families whose payments are made directly to the fa-
mily. These facts may be consistent with the hypothesis in which parents that are more involved with 
their children are more conscious of the financial needs of their kids and responsibilities to them. 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics (average) for gap 1,2
Amount Anticipated
By Parent
(1)
Amount Actually Received 
By Parent
(2)
Difference between 
Anticipated and Actual
(3)
All Child Support
Agreements  [2,131]
3,596
(80.7)
3,047
(74.5)
549
(40.6)
States with “Paternity” Laws [346] 3,305
(163.8)
2,820
(168.0)
484
(58.9)
States with Income Withholding Laws 
[1,479]
3,524
(89.3)
3,028
(89.3)
495
(31.3)
States with Income Tax Laws 
[388]
3,608
(223.2)
2,933
(130.4)
675
(181.5)
Voluntary Agreement
[563]
4,334
(188.2)
3,910
(143.7)
424
(123.4)
Court Ordered Agreement [1,504] 3,327
(87.1)
2,742
(88.3)
585
(32.1)
Agreements with Health Care 
Provisions [1,717]
3,897
(96.2)
3,338
(88.2)
559
(49.2)
Agreements Specifying
Joint Custody [527]
4,618
(210.1)
4,190
(210.5)
428
(57.1)
Paid Directly to Family
[744]
4,514
(192.3)
4,063
(170.2)
451
(96.6)
Paid Through Court
[761]
3,311
(88.7)
2,775
(91.1)
536
(42.2)
Paid Through Agency
Or Other Method [626]
2,880
(98.7)
2,201
(92.5)
678
(58.8)
Agreement Specify Regular Visitation 
[1,378]
3,839
(112.2)
3,269
(100.8)
570
(59.1)
Notes: 1)Standard Errors are in parentheses.  2) Number of observations for each restricted sample between squared brackets.
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Some specific aspects from the agreement, such as visitation schedule and agency or court 
being involved in the child support process, are separately analyzed. Agreements with more res-
trictions, such as the ones with specific visitation schedule or health care provisions, increase the 
average gap amount ($570 and $559, respectively). The intermediations of court or agency both in 
the process of reaching an agreement or receiving the amount settled also contribute to an incre-
ase in the default payment. These child support agreement with many restrictions have the worse 
combination of results possible: lower amounts granted and higher amounts in debt. These results 
indicate that the relationship between parents closely influences the child support results. When 
parents do not have to refer to third parts to solve their agreements to make the same agreements 
to be fulfilled, or when the agreements are very general counting on the responsibility that non-
custodial parents feel in relation to their kids, the lower will be the chances that child support will 
not be paid or that the settled amount is below expectations.
3.1 Probit estimation
Equation (4.2) represents the Probit Model:
	 Probit ( _ ) i i
i
gap indicator X error= α + b +∑ 	 (2)
where gap indicator is an indicator variable with value 1 if there is a gap between child support 
orders and receipts, and iX are the independent variables included in the probit regressions sepa-
rately.  The demographic characteristics included in Xi	include the custodial parent’s age, educa-
tion level (indicators for high school degree, at least some college and college degree),17 were or are 
married (indicator variable that assumes value equal 1 if the custodial parent is currently married, 
divorced or separated, and assumes value equal zero if he/she is never married), ethnicity (indica-
tors for Blacks and Hispanic),18 indicator for custodial parent being a male, and year indicators 
(for 1992 and 1993).19 Table 3 presents the results from this probit equation. As the custodial par-
ent gets older, there is a significant decrease in the probability of a gap (-.8%). The higher the level 
of education and the indicator for the custodial parent being the father have the same influence on 
the dependent variable (between 6 and 10% for the former and more than 15% for the latter). 
In the second column of Table 3, I present results from the same probit regression including 
demographics and two additional variables. First, I include an indicator variable that equals one 
if the custodial parent worked at least some period during the two years and half that he/she was 
included in the sample, and zero otherwise). Second, I include custodial parent family income.20 
The inclusion of the custodial parent’s labor force participation dummy and family income changes 
the significance of the explanatory variables but not their signs. The age of custodial parent still 
has the effect of decreasing the probability of a gap. However, only custodial parents with at least a 
college degree have the significant result of decreasing the probability of a default in child support 
orders (-7.4%). An interesting result is the negative effect that the increase in the custodial parent’s 
income has on the probability of a gap (-2.7%). This result may be indicating that the richer the 
17 Excluded category: less than high school
18 Excluded category: white or others.
19 Excluded category: 1991.
20 This variable was constructed as the average family income during the period that he/she was part of the sample interviewed. 
The family income is measured in thousand of dollars.
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custodial parent, the more resources he/she has available to fight for the right of receiving the child 
support amount. 
Table 3 – Probability model: Probit ( _ ) i i
i
gap indicator X error= α + b +∑ i,ii
Probit Mg.
Effects
Probit Mg.
Effects
Probit Mg.
Effects
Probit Mg.
Effects
Age
-.023
(.005)
-.008
(.002)
-.019
(.005)
-.007
(.002)
-.017
(.005)
-.006
(.002)
-.016
(.005)
-.006
(.002)
Were or Are Married
-.117
(.095)
-.043
(.035)
-.090
(.095)
-.033
(.035)
-.035
(.098)
-.012
(.035)
-.005
(.101)
-.002
(.036)
Male Indicator
.400
(.138)
.153
(.055)
.415
(.138)
.156
(.055)
.423
(.140)
.161
(.055)
.395
(.144)
.149
(.057)
Custodial Parent Works - -
-.007
(.092)
-.003
(.033)
.031
(.093)
.011
(.033)
.048
(.096)
.017
(.033)
Custodial Parent Family 
Income - -
-.076
(.018)
-.027
(.006)
-.062
(.018)
-.022
(.006)
-.071
(.019)
-.025
(.007)
Court Ordered Agreement - - - -
.308
(.072)
.106
(.024)
.320
(.074)
.108
(.024)
Alternative Type of 
Agreement
- - - - .092(.180)
.033
(.067)
.107
(.184)
.038
(.068)
Receiving C.S. through 
Court
- - - - .165(.074)
.060
(.027)
.248
(.081)
.089
(.029)
Receiving C.S. through 
Agency
- - - - .330(.082)
.122
(.031)
.375
(.087)
.137
(.033)
Other method of receiving 
C.S.
- - - - .483(.141)
.185
(.056)
.547
(.146)
.209
(.058)
# of Children receiving 
C.S.
- - - - .031(.041)
.011
(.015)
.040
(.042)
.014
(.014)
Paternity  Estab  Law Ind. - - - - - -
.408
(.227)
.151
(.087)
Income Tax Law Indicator - - - - - -
-6.63
(.588)
-.994
(.003)
Income Withhold. Indic. - - - - - -
5.40
(.862)
.931
(.022)
State Indicators No No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant .471(.166)
- .471
(.176)
- -.207
(.210)
- .522
(.707)
-
Number of Observations 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135
Pseudo R-squared .0285 .0285 .0355 .0355 .0549 .0549 .0815 .0815
Notes: i) Standard errors are in parentheses. ii) Variables explained on the main text. On this regression I control for custodial 
parent’s demographic characteristics (age, marital status and gender), custodial parent’s labor market characteristics (if 
he/she works and family income), type of child support agreement and how it was meant to be received, State of residence 
of custodial parent laws.
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In the columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, I include characteristics of the child support agreement. 
Indicator variables for the agreement type (court order or other type of not voluntary agreement),21 
how the support ordered amount is received (indicators for through court, through agency or other 
indirect way to receive child support),22 and number of children included in the child support order 
were included in the regression. The inclusion of the additional control variables for agreement 
characteristics has little influence on the significance or magnitude of custodial parent’s age, the 
indicator for the custodial parent being a male, and custodial parent’s income. However, the child 
support agreement characteristics are all positive and significant. Agreements settled by court or 
payments being made indirectly to the custodial parent (i.e. through court, agency or other metho-
ds) increase the probability of a gap. The presence of some kind of “intermediary” between parents 
is positively correlated with the existence of a gap as well. After a marital disruption, there is usu-
ally a low level of trust between parents. Non-custodial parent may not believe that his/her money 
is being used in the best interest of his/her children. The voluntary agreement or direct payments 
indicate that the relationship between parents is “satisfactory” and, therefore, the trust level betwe-
en them is not completely destroyed by the marital disruption. The inclusion of any third part in 
the child support accord or receipt indicates the lack of reliability between them and, therefore, may 
positively influence the probability of a failure to pay the agreed or ordered amount.
The final specification for the probit model includes indicator variables for the existence of 
specific laws to enforce child support and to reduce the number of children without support from 
the absent parent,23 as well indicator variables for the custodial parent State of residence. The 
existence of paternity establishment laws or income withholding laws significantly increases the 
probability that the gap exists.  States that have income tax pass-through, on the other hand, have 
lower probabilities of the existence of a gap.24 These results indicate that specific regulations over 
child support can have contradictory effects. The plain creation of legislation to improve the well-
being of families with single parents does not ensure that this law will be fully implemented as it 
was planned.25 
Changing the basic specification does not significantly inf luence the results. Custodial 
parent’s age, the father having custody, custodial parent’s family income and agreement specific 
characteristics are of similar magnitudes and statistically significant for every specification.  Ove-
rall, results from Table 3 suggest that there is a diminishing probability of a gap in the child sup-
port payments the older the custodial parent, the richer his/her family,  and if he/she lives in some 
State where there Income Tax Law in defense of child support agreements/orders exist. 
21 Excluded category: voluntary agreement.
22 Excluded category: directly pay to the custodial parent.
23 A very good description of these laws and reasons why they were implemented can be seen in Garfinkel, McLanahan and Robins 
(1994).
24 The paternity establishment per se does not guarantee that the absent parent will agree or follow a child support order. Income 
withholding would be a good solution if there was a way to control where the non-custodial parent works, how much he/she 
earn etc. However, there is no integrated system that can control the labor force movement of non-custodial parent to control 
movements with the major intention of avoiding child support payments, for example. An ideal system would be very expensive 
and high-maintenance. Therefore, a law regulating income withholding has the good intention of creating a new support for 
children with an absent parent, although its effect it is not easily predictable. The Income Tax Law is the simpler way to collect 
debts from absent parents. For this reason, it is the one with the bigger negative effect in the probability of a gap. 
25 The existence of these laws may be considered endogenous. States where regulations on child support are more desired or neces-
sary may be the ones where these laws exist first. Endogeneity will be the subject of a latter section of this study.
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3.2  Analysis of the gap’s magnitude
Having studied the determinants of the gap, I now turn my attention to the issue of the size 
of a child support gap. Different factors can have distinct influences over the magnitude or over the 
gap’s existence. A simple regression of the gap size on covariates is used:
	
i i
i
Gap X= α + b + ε∑ 	 (3)
where Xi	represents the explanatory variables. The custodial parent’s demographic characteristics 
included are: age, indicators for education degree completed, marital status, ethnicity indicators 
and gender.26 Custodial parent’s labor force participation and family income are included in the 
second set of regressions. The income used at this time is relative to earnings from employment 
and income from assets. I do not use the other sources of income (as, for example, child support 
receipts, social security, alimony, etc). The third series of regressions include the agreement char-
acteristics: type of agreement, how the child support is received, and number of children receiv-
ing the child support. The final specification also includes the laws and State indicators. In all 
regressions, indicators for year in the sample (1992 and 1993, with excluded category 1991) are 
included.
To account for the potential endogeneity of parental labor supply and the gap between actual 
and expected payments, I also present evidence from a 2SLS regression where I use the lagged 
value of custodial parent working as an instrument for current work status. This variable is an 
indicator that equals 1 if the custodial parent was part of the labor force in the prior months that 
he/she was included in the sample and zero otherwise. 
A good instrument is the one that although is highly correlated with the variable of interest, 
it is not correlated with the error term, as the instrumented variable is (Gujarati, 1999; Maddala, 
1977). The lagged value of the indicator of the working status of the custodial parent has these 
necessary characteristics, since the past working status has a strong correlation with the current 
working status and, at the same time, there is no reason to believe that the error term of period t 
has correlation with this variable from period t-1. For these reasons, the lagged value of the custo-
dial parent working status constitutes a possible instrument for his/her current working status in a 
2SLS regression.
The first stage of the system of equations is:
	
. . ( . . )i i
i
Cust ParWorks X Lag Cust ParWorks= α + b +δ + ε∑ 	 (4)
where the indicator variable that specifies if the custodial parent worked last period is the instru-
ment for the indicator variable custodial parent currently works. The second stage of the regres-
sion is Equation 3, using the estimated values for the instrumented variable from Equation (4).
26 All of these variables were described in the previous sub-section.
520	 New evidence on the determinants of the gap between child support awards and child support receipts
Econ. aplic., 11(4): 507-525, out-dez 2007
Table 4 presents the results for these regressions. Results are reasonable given inclusion of the 
new variables in the regression. The use of the instrumental variable does not change the signifi-
cance or the direction of the result, only the magnitude of the estimated parameters in all cases. 
The labor force participation indicator had no effect on the existence of the gap. Table 4 also 
shows that this variable has a substantial effect in reducing the size of the gap (reduction of $613.25 
per year in the gap, using IV approach with the final specification). This result suggests that custo-
dial parents that maintain a job increase the level of trust with the absent parent or make him/her 
realize that his/her kids are really in need of the child support amount. The family income, that 
decreases the probability of existing a gap, increases its size. It is not a large effect, only $60.23 per 
year, but it is still significant.
Variables related to the agreement arrangement, as type of agreement or how the amount is 
received, have the same positive effect over the gap’s amount, increasing its value. The significant 
estimated parameters are court ordered agreement (increasing by $181 per year the amount in debt), 
other type of non-voluntary agreement ($455 per year), receiving the child support by indirect me-
thods that not through court or agency ($468), and number of children with child support order 
($157). Neither one of the laws related to child support enforcement have significant effect on the 
gap’s magnitude.
In general, results from Table 4 show that, while some demographics characteristics of cus-
todial parent are important for the existence of the gap, they have no significant effect on its size. 
The most important variables for the definition of size gap are the custodial parent’s labor force 
profile and income, and the agreement characteristics. This result suggests that the relationship 
among parents is the base for the fulfillment of the agreement. Courts and agency work on hel-
ping men and women that stroke with the responsibility of sustaining children without their other 
parent, while the laws make the effort of serving the interest of single-parent homes too. However, 
their work is vastely facilitated when absent parent gets more conscious of his/her obligation with 
the previous family. This receptiveness leads to an improvement of the bond both with his/her ex-
partner as well with his/her children.
Table 4 – Regressions: Gap = i i
i
Xα + b + ε∑    
Instrumental Variable: Lag( Custodial Parent Works) 
Baseline 
Regression
Incorporating Labor Force 
Characteristics
Incorporating Agreement 
Characteristics
Incorporating Enforcement 
and Time Effects
(OLS) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
Age
-3.45
(6.39)
-5.31
(6.50)
-5.08
(6.51)
-3.74
(6.53)
-3.55
(6.54)
-1.35
(6.52)
-1.11
(6.53)
High School Indicator
-171.24
(124.76)
-114.96
(126.19)
-64.81
(127.46)
-84.96
(126.45)
-42.49
(127.56)
-94.64
(127.36)
-58.53
(128.47)
Some College Indicator
115.07
(147.47)
149.17
(149.29)
195.86
(150.31)
175.59
(149.47)
216.61
(150.41)
176.54
(150.17)
210.48
(151.06)
College Degree Indicator
-201.97
(132.67)
-171.20
(137.27)
-114.02
(138.76)
-146.89
(137.91)
-97.75
(139.25)
-159.52
(138.18)
-118.85
(139.46)
Were or Are Married
85.10
(138.05)
91.03
(138.00)
105.98
(138.30)
72.77
(140.85)
87.08
(141.13)
61.29
(141.93)
72.71
(142.15)
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Baseline 
Regression
Incorporating Labor Force 
Characteristics
Incorporating Agreement 
Characteristics
Incorporating Enforcement 
and Time Effects
(OLS) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
Black Indicator
.545
(135.84)
12.34
(136.84)
-2.45
(137.13)
-24.25
(137.31)
-37.87
(137.57)
-70.83
(144.14)
-79.64
(144.33)
Hispanic Indicator
127.16
(152.14)
123.42
(152.35)
105.18
(152.70)
111.01
(152.08)
94.88
(152.39)
70.89
(158.12)
61.03
(158.32)
Male Indicator
44.66
(199.50)
64.74
(199.00)
83.08
(199.39)
62.56
(198.59)
78.99
(198.93)
30.06
(199.58)
42.12
(199.83)
Custodial Parent Works -
-479.04
(132.17)
-816.20
(172.78)
-428.47
(133.01)
-738.09
(174.80)
-352.78
(133.52)
-613.25
(176.21)
Custodial Parent Family 
Income
- 53.36
(23.82)
62.25
(24.04)
64.78
(24.01)
71.88
(24.18) 54.03(24.18)
60.23
(24.36)
Court Ordered 
Agreement
- - - 163.58(96.91)
160.43
(97.04)
183.45
(97.05)
180.62
(97.15)
Alternative Type of 
Agreement
- - - 370.71(247.61)
376.94
(247.94)
450.03
(248.09)
455.02
(248.32)
Receiving C.S. through 
Court
- - - 60.59(100.9)
61.84
(100.99)
176.26
(108.79)
174.27
(108.90)
Receiving C.S. through 
Agency
- - - 144.84(114.27)
127.62
(114.59)
185.00
(119.03)
168.68
(119.33)
Other method of 
receiving C.S.
- - - 411.72(202.39)
411.67
(202.65)
468.23
(202.88)
468.29
(203.07)
Number of Children 
receiving C.S.
- - - 156.93(57.93)
142.91
(58.23)
168.39
(57.87)
157.27
(58.13)
Paternity Establishment 
Law Ind.
- - - - - 270.23(298.89)
293.49
(299.34)
Income Tax Law Indicator - - - - -
-455.50
(806.57)
-1162.16
(1356.10)
Income Withholding 
Indicator 
- - - - - 219.59(952.35)
220.22
(953.22)
State Indicators No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 566.25(238.11)
868.28
(251.03)
1,077
(260.62)
297.96
(296.61)
521.64
(308.05)
192.69
(1251)
1083.97
(975.26)
Number of Observations 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135 2,135
Adjusted R-squared .004 .010 .007 .016 .013 .038 .036
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses and the same notes from tables 1 and 3.
(Continuation Table 4)
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3.3  Multinomial logit analysis
As shown in the previous regressions, agreement type is a significant factor in the existence 
and the size of the gap.   However, agreement type could be an endogenous variable to the parents’ 
characteristics,27 since its choice may reflect the level of animosity between the parents. When the 
ex-couple has difficulties in reaching agreements, it is more likely that they will have problems 
following the guidelines predetermined by this agreement, therefore the importance of including 
the dummies for the previous regressions. The multinomial logit analysis is used to illustrate the 
mechanism that may underlie the resulting agreement type.
In the present study, an agreement can be reached in three ways: 
A1 = voluntarily,
A2 = court ordered, or 
A3 = alternative agreement.
In order to predict the determinants of agreement type, I use the custodial parent’s characte-
ristics, including age, schooling, race, labor force participation, and number of children involved 
with child support. The main goal of this exercise is to observe how custodial parent’s characteris-
tics increase or decrease the probability of obtaining one of the three particular types of agreement 
the basic model of agreement type definition is28 
	 Prob	(Ai	=	j)	=	
'
'
j i
k i
X
X
k
e
e
b
b
=
∑
3
1
		 (5)	
where Xi	is the vector of custodial parent’ socioeconomic characteristics and b is the vector that 
defines the probabilities of each type of agreement being reached. Presented this way, this model 
is indeterminate. The solution for the model indeterminacy is normalization, where one of the 
categories of agreement is set equal to zero. I choose the category “voluntary agreement” to be 
zero and, by this, it will be the base category. All the results from the multinomial estimation are 
interpreted by comparison with the base category, voluntary agreement.
 After the normalization, the intuitive way to look at equation 5 is
	 'ln ij j i
i
P
X
P
 
= b 
 1
	 				(6)
Equation 6 shows that the logarithm of the probability that some custodial parent reaches a 
specific type of agreement is a linear function of the custodial parent’s characteristics. Although 
this equation is very simple, its interpretation is not trivial. It is not possible to interpret the estima-
ted jb  coefficient as the outcome from the j agreement type. Every marginal effect will include the 
entire b vector. Therefore, the simpler and more useful way to interpret the estimated coefficient 
will be by comparison with the chosen base category. 
27 Notice that the type of agreement is not endogenous to the existence neither the magnitude of the gap between child support 
awards and receipts.
28 Exposition of this model follows Greene (1997), and Robins and Dickinson (1985).
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The probability of voluntary agreement is higher when both the coefficients for the court 
ordered category and other types of agreement are negative and significant. As Table 5 shows, this 
happens in three cases: when the custodial parent is older, when he/she is not single, and when 
he/she is not black or Hispanic. Table 5 also shows that there are two cases where it lowers the pro-
bability of a court order settlement:29 when the custodial parent has more years of education, and 
when his/her family income is higher.
Table 5 – Maximum-likelihood multinomial logit i,ii: Prob (Ai = j) = 
'
'
j i
k i
X
X
k
e
e
b
b
=
∑
3
1
 
omitted category: voluntary agreement
Court Ordered Alternative Types of Agreement
Custodial Parent Age -.017
(.008)
-.075
(.023)
High School Indicator -.483
(.184)
-.185
(.438)
Some College Indicator -.770
(.204)
-.441
(.522)
College Degree -.615
(.193)
-.034
(.470)
Black Indicator .519
(.206)
1.19
(.376)
Hispanic Indicator .072
(.199)
-.330
(.628)
Were or Are Married -.645
(.222)
-.920
(.410)
Male Indicator -.194
(.233)
.278
(.635)
Custodial Parent Works -.228
(.188)
.093
(.461)
Custodial Parent Family Income -.100
(.028)
-.065
(.086)
Number of Children Receiving Child Support -.017
(.074)
.190
(.185)
Constant 3.16
(.377)
1.01
(.835)
Pseudo R-Squared .044
Number of Observations 2,135
Notes: i) Results from the Maximum-Likelihood Multinomial Logit should be compared to the omitted category, Voluntary 
Agreement. ii) Standard Errors are in parentheses.
29  I.e. higher is the probability of voluntary or other type of agreement.
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The multinomial logit model clarifies some trends behind the personal attributes of custodial 
parents that define the type of agreement that can be reached. However, it is not enough evidence 
to accept or reject the hypothesis of endogeneity between the gap and types of agreement. 
4  coNclusioN 
The importance of child support to a society where there is an increasing number of single-
parent families and where a great proportion of children are expected to live some part of their 
childhood with only one parent (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999; and Robins and Dickinson, 1985) 
is not disputable. Federal and state governments acted to improve the situation of these families 
and children that have a larger probability of becoming poor (Garfinkel, McLanahan and Robins, 
1994). The implications of these legislative changes and the effects that custodial and non-custodial 
parents main characteristics had over the child support orders and their collection were separately 
studied by different authors (Beller and Graham, 1993; Sonestein and Calhoun, 1990; and Veum, 
1992).
This study analyzes both the probability of a gap between child support orders and child 
support receipts, as well the characteristics from the custodial parent and the agreement that may 
influence the size of this gap. While there is a decreasing probability of the gap’s existence, the 
older the custodial parent, the wealthier is his/her family, and the closer the residence of the non-
custodial parent, these variables do not have the same influence over the size of the gap. For the 
magnitude of the difference between amounts ordered and received, the most important features 
are the labor force participation of custodial parent and the agreement’s characteristics.30 Custodial 
parents that are involved in the labor market signal to their former partner that they are doing their 
part in trying to support children and, by this, the smaller the gap between child support orders 
and receipts attributed to them. The agreement characteristics results support the idea that parents 
with a good relationship after their marital disruption do not need an intermediate either for the 
child support order or its collection. This better connection between parents improves the odds of 
the child support being completely paid and, whenever this payment is partial, the difference be-
tween the order and the amount actually received is smaller than when compared to child support 
orders intermediated by third parts (e.g., courts or agencies).
The improvement in the enforcement of child support laws and the creation of institutions 
that help custodial parents to collect the money to sustain children that no longer live with both pa-
rents are well intended and have positive effects for child support collection. The impact that these 
laws and institutions have over the child support gaps is not within the scope of this paper. Results 
presented here corroborate the idea that the association of tougher laws concerning fulfillment of 
child support and stronger links between parents. Therefore, a good relationship after they broke 
up improves the likelihood of full collection of child support and/or lower debts to be collected. 
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